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The First Thirty Years
by Carolyn Marvin and Quentin J. Schultze
Alliances among citizens, the radio manufacturers, and the FCC have shifted with
each new compromise on behalf of the “public interest.”
The Middle East oil crisis of late 1973 focused the attention of the American
public on Citizens' Band radio. Protesting emergency speed limits to conserve the
nation's fuel, independent truckers for whom the new rules meant a wage
sacrifice used CB radios to coordinate widely televised highway traffic blockades.
Soon CB was being depicted by the national media as an "outlaw" frequency
band, a technological last frontier for rugged individualists. Nontrucker motorists
began buying and using Citizens' Band radio to avoid speed tickets. In an aura of
illegality, CB had become a mass consumer product.
In January 1977 the Federal Communications Commission expanded the
portion of the spectrum allotted to the Citizens' service from 23 to 40 channels
(26.965 MHz to 27.405 MHz), despite increasing demands on spectrum space by
all land mobile, amateur, and special non-broadcast services. The expansion is
good news for some radio manufacturers seeking to become industry giants, and
for giants seeking a new hold on the market.
The FCC has also recently been examining proposals to open a second,
complementary Citizens’ Band at a higher, more technically suitable frequency
(41 Fed. Reg. 32677, [1976]). If the agency is unable to resist a combination of
industry and consumer interests, that will be partly due to its own stimulation of
the growth of a band that is technically inadequate for the amount and nature of
radio traffic in the Citizens' radio service. Overcrowding in the 27 MHz band has
created interference that is not confined to the Citizens' service but also affects
the lower portion of the television spectrum (41 Fed. Reg. 47445 [1976]), and
even the operation of ordinary stereo hi-fi in many urban areas. In this band,
perhaps the most serious problem for the long term is cyclical solar interference,
which is expected to worsen for some years to come (19).
The recent expansion will surely exacerbate other existing problems,
especially unlicensed operation and illegal transmissions, from obscene calls,
malicious interference, and advertising to the peddling of narcotics and
prostitutes over the air waves. These abuses are not a recent development in the
Citizens' Band, but their incidence has mounted drastically with the increase of
users. By January 1, 1977, the FCC had licensed 7,668,457 Class D operators.

Official estimates placed the number of unlicensed operators at 10 percent more,
but industry sales suggest that the total number of licensed and unlicensed
operators is probably at least three times the number of licensees (24).
The Citizens' radio service was one of a number of postwar radio services.
Wartime research had increased the useable portion of the radio spectrum about
100 times, and had introduced new technologies like radar and microwave. But
until 1945 radio use by the public had been limited to groups directly concerned
with protecting property and public safety, and to a few industrial enterprises like
bridge construction, oil exploration, and power line maintenance.
With the end of the wartime need to restrict spectrum use to defense, the
FCC had a new opportunity to encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest. The Commission sought technical advice on wider
spectrum allocation from the Radio Manufacturers' Association, the principal
industry group, which organized a Radio Technical Planning Board to make
engineering recommendations to the FCC. When the Commission finally assigned
experimental station authorizations in 1945, there was wide industry agreement
that RTPB had succeeded in planning frequency allocations and systems
standardization in accord with manufacturing interests (23).
Looking ahead to a day when electronics would transform the lives of
ordinary citizens, the FCC had pictured a future in which peacetime technology
would bring about a utopia of democratic possibilities (7). Public safety was no
longer the only priority for postwar radio. The FCC hoped that the operational
experience of the experimental stations would provide a basis for developing
policies to stimulate and weigh broad claims on national radio resources by a
diversified citizenry. Railroad, utility, relay press service, urban and highway
mobile services, state guard services, services for geological survey work and
motion picture filming were all soon established. In 1945, five station
authorizations also were granted to develop equipment in the 460-470 MHz
range for a Citizens' radio service. This decision grew out of a suggestion by
Motorola vice president Daniel Noble, who foresaw a market for an inexpensive,
short-range, two-way business radio service (17).
The FCC expanded Noble's idea to encompass a "private radio
communications service" for which only the simplest grasp of radio technology
and regulation would be needed. Station licensees would be "free to use the
service for their own purposes" but could make no charge for sending or receiving
messages. Room for 1,000 channels was provided (7, 9).

The agency entertained a vast range of possible uses for the Citizens'
service. In cars and other places where doctors were away from telephones, it
might provide a physicians' calling service. Department stores, dairies, and
laundries could communicate with their delivery trucks by its means. Large
industrial plants, farms and ranches, harbor and river craft could take advantage
of it. In mountain and swamp areas the hazards of hunting, fishing, and hiking
would be reduced by the Citizens' service. Communication from construction
crew to base, from private aircraft to home, private boat to clubhouse, steeple
jack to ground crew, hospital to ambulance, in waterway dredging operations,
assembly lines, volunteer fire-fighting, parades, and parking lot operations
offered an wide range of possibilities for business and community use (8, 9, 10,
12).
The envisioned image of the individual user was more restricted. The FCC
had imagined that individuals who owned planes or yachts, hunted or climbed
mountains in their leisure time would all be served by Citizens' radio. No mention
was made, however, of the factory worker signaling his wife with a pocket
transmitter to put dinner on the table as he boarded a bus home at the end of the
day. Nor was there any anticipation of the use of Citizens' radio to coordinate a
labor strike. The Commission conceived Citizens' radio as a private service for
small businesses and some affluent individuals.
All these options were limited for the first decade by lack of equipment.
The Commission had been poorly advised by its industrial experts. Contrary to
expectation, equipment for the very high frequencies of the 460-470 MHz band
could not easily be adapted from war surplus material or inexpensively
manufactured. Sophisticated engineering was necessary in radios operating
reliably in this range. Perhaps hastily, since only one manufacturer had been
certified by the Commission to make Citizens' radio equipment, the FCC changed
the status of Citizens' radio from an experimental to a regular radio service with
two classes on June 1, 1949. Class A industrial and public service operators were
permitted more powerful transmitters and could broadcast on all 10 MHz. Class B
small business and individual operators used less powerful transmitters and
confined their operation to the frequencies 462-468 MHz (42 FCC 188 [1949]).
By 1952, the wide usage predicted for Citizens' radio by the FCC had not
materialized, since manufacturers could not profitably make the expensive
equipment required for it.

Indeed, most license applications requested FCC authorization only for
remote control operation of model planes, boats, and garage door openers. The
FCC created a new Class C service for remote control and sensibly assigned it to
27.255 MHz, a technically more accessible frequency which licensees shared with
ham radio operators who used it for experimental purposes (42 FCC 219 [1952]).
Tacked on to the service as an afterthought, this frequency would become the
home of the Citizens' Band of the present day.
During the 1950s, the Citizens' service did begin to grow, but mostly among
Class A commercial users who could afford to pay more for adequately
engineered equipment. By 1958, Motorola, Kaar Engineering, RCA, General
Electric, Communications Co., and Royalcall were all producing crystal controlled
units for $500 to $700 apiece which could be used either in Class A or on nearby
land mobile frequencies (21). At mid-decade the FCC reported that the largest
group of Citizens' radio users were Class A urban commercial dispatch
operations—department store delivery, ice and fuel delivery, heavy construction
operations, and television and radio servicing (11). Apart from Class C stations,
most of the 18,600 Citizens’ stations operating in 1956 were used for business
purposes by commercial firms. Only two companies produced for the less wealthy
Class B market, and only one of these was still in business by 1957. Even at $100 a
unit, Class B equipment still was not cheap enough for widespread individual use.
Since it could not be crystal controlled at this price, it was also markedly
unreliable.
A service loosely structured for personal flexibility was now dominated by
commercial users and new regulatory problems. Unable to enforce the old rules
of the service effectively, the FCC proposed a complete revision in April of 1957 to
take account of the majority of licensees. Industry interests like Motorola argued
in support of revision that many business communications carried on over Class A
and B frequencies with different kinds of equipment could be more efficiently
consolidated into one service and technical system (42 FCC 750 [1958]). Although
the FCC had declared its chief responsibility was to small business users, larger
businesses were the most likely to be diversified and to benefit from economies
of consolidation. The Commission proposed tougher technical standards for Class
B and abolished a provision limiting eligibility in the service to those who qualified
in no other services. The Commission also hinted that it was moving toward"
reallocation of the 460-470 MHz band to other important" services (44A FCC 1343
[1958]). Users of the neighboring land mobile services, led by American
Telephone and Telegraph, with taxicab and industrial services foiling in behind,

had indeed made many requests to be allowed into the less populous Class B
frequencies.
Vocaline Company, the sole manufacturer of Class B equipment in 1957,
recognized the consequences of these proposals for itself and its customers.
Stricter emission controls on less efficient Class B stations would sharply raise
retail prices on new equipment and would make existing Class B transceivers
obsolete. An influx of eager, high-power commercial users would further lessen
the reliability of lower-power Class B. The proposals, Vocaline argued,
contradicted the FCC's original promise to provide a widely available, cheap radio
service with minimum technical requirements. The minor problem of interference
from Class B transceivers should be resolved by mutual cooperation among all
licensees of a service in which frequencies were not exclusively awarded. Vocaline
claimed sales of 2,000 transceivers a month to “small businesses, civic
organizations, sportsmen and others." By late 1957, it had sold more than 20,000
such radios priced below $100 apiece (23 Fed. Reg. 4784 [1958]).
Vocaline's protests were in vain. In June of 1958, the FCC issued a Report
and Order which reallocated most of the 460-470 MHz band to the Industrial
radio services. The Commission found that the 6,000 licensees of 115,000
transmitters in the Special Industrial Radio Service were of "higher priority" than
the users of approximately 21,000 Class B radios (23 Fed. Reg. 4784 [1958]). The
Commission would permit Class B stations to operate on their old frequencies for
a limited period, but at half their previously allowed power, and with new
frequency tolerance restrictions. Class B users were warned not to count on the
continued existence of their service. The Commission, it appears, felt that Class B
users operated their stations mostly for non-productive purposes and could not
be preferred over taxicab and telephone repair services.
Although the FCC had decided to sacrifice the equipment and investment of Class
B users and manufacturers, and to protect and extend the interests of industrial
users and manufacturers in the 460-470 MHz range, it did not give up the idea of a
personal Citizens' radio service.
In an August 1958 Report and Order, the Commission created a new Class D
"for personal use by any individual," which it especially recommended to those
Class A users who would not eventually qualify for industrial reassignment.
Conceding that radio equipment which made efficient use of spectrum space
could be manufactured cheaply for personal use only at lower frequencies, the

Commission reallocated 23 channels between 26.96 MHz and 27.23 MHz from the
amateur hobby band to the new Class D (42 FCC 874 [1958]). According to the
FCC, the amateurs had made little use of these frequencies.
The amateurs vigorously protested that this was the only portion of the
spectrum suitable for their experimental broadcasting, and pointed out that
certain propagation characteristics of this band which made it useful for longdistance experimental communication would create severe interference in the
short-distance Citizens’ service. During the peak period of each 11-year sunspot
cycle, signals in this range—even those from very low-power stations—would be
tossed thousands of miles, bouncing and reflecting erratically off the ionosphere.
The hams warned that each of the 23 channels would become a continental party
line (42 FCC 874 [1958]). The hams were ignored. For a second time the FCC's lack
of engineering foresight had led to a fundamental error in its disposition of the
Citizens' service. Its first error had been to assign the service to such a high
frequency that reasonably priced equipment could not be made for individual
use. Now the Commission had seriously misjudged the disruptive effects of the
sunspot cycle.
Less than a year after Class D had been established, the FCC expressed
concern about "improper communications," which were increasing with the
number of licensed operators (12). Partly because the 27 MHz band had been an
amateur hobby band, partly because of the deliberately misleading advertising of
some manufacturers, and partly because of the loose wording of the
Commission's regulations, many operators seemed to believe that Class D was
mainly for hobby communication—for fun. The FCC, however, had intended to
limit it to “substantive and useful messages related to either the business
activities or personal convenience of private citizens" (44B FCC 1920 [1960]). To
discourage improper communications, the agency ruled in 1960 that
transmissions were to be no more than five minutes long and must be followed
by two minutes of silence. By 1964 the FCC had even issued a list of specifically
prohibited "hobby-type" expressions and messages compiled from transcriptions
of conversations commonly heard all over the band (38 FCC 1238 [1965]).
The Commission felt that hobby communication would load the Citizens' Band
with a volume of traffic far exceeding its capacity (38 FCC 1255 [1965]).
Users and manufacturers, however, experimented from the beginning with
schemes to promote orderly hobby communication in the Class D band. Proposals

were aired in the hobby press to establish special calling channels for radio
operators in boats and automobiles (3). These proposals ran counter to the FCC’s
conception of the band in two important ways. First, FCC policy prohibited
reservation of any part of the band for special functions or groups of users.
Besides the objection to privileged use of a free radio resource, the designation of
special frequencies might someday become the basis of a claim to statutory
protection. Second, these proposals encouraged inter-station communication.
The FCC had expected transmission to take place mainly between different units
of the same station license. A dry-cleaner would talk to his/her own fleet of
delivery trucks, or an explorer would get the weather report from base camp. The
informal proposals multiplied opportunities for unknown stations to exchange
signals.
We do not know how much Class B operation was inter-station, but it can
safely be assumed that "rag-chewing" and "hamming" prevailed in Class D from
the start. The first of many petitions to change the rules limiting permissible
communications was filed with the FCC within 18 months after the opening of the
band (42 FCC 1040 [1960]). Expensive industrial equipment for multi-unit stations
never had a significant market in the service. By late 1960 the most widely sold CB
rig was a vacuum tube base station for personal use in house or car. Singlechannel $40 transceivers of this type were technically as reliable as 23-channel
$200 models (3).
Whereas the old Class B service had required at least a moderate amount
of electronic expertise and money, Class D did not. In June of 1960, the FCC
reported that the once starved Citizens' service bulged with 126,000 stations and
441,000 transmitters, and that "the mushrooming Citizens service accounts for
most of the special radio group's workload and headaches during the year" (13),
Since equipment could be purchased without a license, and since the popularity
of the band had created an administrative backlog that caused greater and
greater delays between application and licensing, unlicensed users with fully
installed stations found illegal operation difficult to resist.
On behalf of the growing number of Citizens' operators in trucks and
automobiles, Vocaline Company, now a Class D manufacturer, pressed the FCC to
clarify its rule forbidding "any transmission designed to elicit a response from
random or unknown stations." The FCC replied that transmission might be
directed to unknown motels, gas stations, or garages within limited areas so long
as the transmission was "adequately specific to indicate the station or stations
desired" (3). The reasonableness of this ruling did not ease the Commission's

mounting enforcement problems, however, since it took another step towards
inter-station communication, the goal sought by more and more operators.
Most early Class D operators used proper frequencies, generally observed time
and power limits, and refrained from blatantly illegal practices such as the use of
obscene language.
But old-timers in the band recall that a large group addressed most of their
transmissions to other stations in the early 1960s, and that these transmissions
only bordered on the Commission's guidelines for proper content. A discussion
about where to meet for a few beers, or a conversation about the best fishing
spots in another state are both examples of legitimate personal use which could
not easily be distinguished from hobby communication. It was this elusive
distinction between personal and hobby use, so difficult to fix in printed rules,
that the FCC found harder and harder to maintain.
Operators also used nicknames or "handles" in place of call signs, especially
for deliberate "skip" operation. The FCC had hoped that its 150-mile groundwave
restriction on the range of Class D transmission would discourage illegal efforts to
achieve long-distance communication by bouncing signals off the ionosphere, but
increasing sunspot activity made even unintentional “skywave” operation
unavoidable. A CB user could hear calls from all over the country and even from
abroad on a set no larger than a table radio. Under these circumstances, the thrill
of communicating several thousand miles often outweighed concern for
regulations.
By 1961, the Citizens' Band was the fastest growing of all the radio services.
In that year 80,000 new stations brought the number of licensed stations to
206,000 and the number of licensed transmitters to 657,000 (14). The yachtsmen
and physicians once regarded by the FCC as the beneficiaries of the Citizens'
service were represented by some users, but blue-collar operators flocked to the
CB airways in greatest number, inventing and using a special jargon of Southern
dialect, ham radio terms, and the police 10-code.
The Commission also issued more than 1,500 rule violations to Citizens’
service users in 1961, and brought the first prosecution for indecent language
against a Class D licensee (14). Token monthly fines did not scare very many
potential lawbreakers, but inadequate funding and manpower resources made
more effective FCC enforcement impossible. Frustrated by the indifference of so
many users to basic rules, the Commission proposed new ones late in 1962 to

clarify permissible uses of Citizens' radio. More than 3,000 postcards, letters, and
statements were received from individuals and citizens groups like the Ozark FiveWatters of Fayetteville and the 14W Association of Seattle, and from industry
interests like Nunamaker Electronics and Horizons magazine (27 Fed. Reg. 11500
[1962]; 15). A large number of these requested more permissive rules, but the
FCC dismissed all such proposals as being not in the public interest, convenience,
or necessity (42 FCC 1195 [1964]).
Instead, the FCC sought to make inter-station calling more difficult and
intra-station calling more attractive by removing all time limits on the latter and
lengthening the mandatory silence period for the former. The FCC also prohibited
inter-station calling on all but seven of the 23 available channels. These seven
were lumped together in the middle of the band where most interference from
industrial, medical, and scientific equipment occurred. This arrangement was
described as a new control and limitation on inter-station signals. In practice it
authorized and organized such communication. Indeed, the FCC had proposed to
limit inter-station calling to five channels but yielded to pressure to allow seven in
the final rule making. The FCC also agreed that channels 9 and 11 should logically
be among those assigned to inter-station use since these channels already were
used nationwide as calling frequencies.
ln March of 1964, the FCC tried to curb the growth of the service by
adopting a license application fee. After a brief drop, the number of applications
was soon back to its old level of about 25,000 per month and rising rapidly (42
FCC 1195 [1964]). The license fee (which the Supreme Court struck down in
December, 1976) had backfired in a more serious way, however. Instead of
checking the growth of the service, it had encouraged the proliferation of
unlicensed users over whom the FCC had no jurisdiction. These lawbreakers were
the responsibility of the FBI, which had little ambition to track them down. From
this date the real growth of the service was no longer indicated by license
statistics.
As abuses multiplied, the FCC began publicly to blame Class D equipment
manufacturers.
In 1964, CB had been a $50-million-a-year business which included the
manufacture of sets, antennas, microphones, "how-to" books and hobby
magazines (42 FCC 1195 [1964]). By 1966, CB represented a $300-million-a-year
market (20). Electronic equipment chain stores which had been built to tap the

stereo hi-fi market in metropolitan areas across the country were now expanding
into rural cities and towns to sell CB equipment. Both mail order and electronic
equipment houses distributed promotional literature which advertised the fun of
operation, and hobby equipment with features which resembled those on ham
gear but were completely superfluous for legal operation of CB.
Manufacturers had also sponsored various programs to foster the use of CB
radio. One of the largest, Hallicrafters, had sponsored REACT (Radio Emergency
Associated Citizens Teams), which offered voluntary radio assistance for
conventions, civic affairs, motorists in distress, and in natural disasters. In 1969,
its 40,000 members were picked up by a new sponsor, General Motors Research
Laboratories (18). As illegal operation and congestion increased in the Citizens'
Band and spilled over into neighboring industrial service frequencies, these civic
demonstrations did not mollify the FCC. In February of 1967, the agency called 75
representatives of the major manufacturers to Washington, charged them with
most of the responsibility for operators' lack of respect for Class D rules, and
threatened to impose strict and costly controls on the manufacture of CB sets and
equipment.
The manufacturers were defiant. Summing up their point of view, Popular
Electronics blamed the FCC's poor planning record and "appalling disinterest in
the wants and desires of hundreds of thousands of the very citizens it supposedly
represents" for the CB "mess" (6). Popular Electronics and others urged the
agency to move small business users to a band of their own, since only one-tenth
of the 800,000 Citizens' licenses now belonged to this group. Things had come full
circle from the old Class A and B days. Individual operators and manufacturers
were now demanding the removal of business operators so that the “true"
Citizens' service could go its own way, hobby operation and all.
The FCC also faced a string of challenges to its authority in the courts. But
here it was almost invulnerable. An appeal for judicial review of the 1964 rules,
for example, had charged that they abridged free speech. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Commission's authority to prescribe uses for each
class of radio service, as established in the Communications Act (California
Citizens Band Association v. United States of America and the Federal
Communications Commission, 375 F. 2d 43 [1967]; 16).
Threats and name-calling gradually gave way in the late 1960s to a period
of accommodation between the FCC and a few manufacturers who had begun to
dominate the market. In the cause of maintaining their position against weaker
competitors, these manufacturers exhibited a new spirit of cooperation with the

FCC and expressed support for technical changes the Commission hoped would
help ease congestion (32 Fed. Reg. 3105 [1967]). In return, the FCC seemed less
determined to penalize hobby use of the service. The conciliatory posture of the
agency was clearest in the sweeping rule revisions it proposed in July, 1974, after
the oil crisis debacle had demonstrated its powerlessness to control nearly one
million Class D license-holders and several million more unlicensed operators. For
the first time the FCC did not declare that its main objective was to preserve the
integrity of the Citizens' service under the 1958 rules, but that:
Our view is to eliminate unnecessary rules, to simplify others, and to
reinforce and improve the basic structure of the service so that it will meet
the intended purpose of a two-way radio communications service for
individual United States Citizens (47 FCC 2d 1022 [1974]).
Instead of trying to mold the citizens to the service, the FCC now seemed ready to
mold the service to the citizens.
The Commission made its first gesture early in 1970 by designating an
exclusive motorist-in-distress channel (22 FCC 2d 635 [1970]. Nor were the new
equipment specifications issued by the Commission in 1973 the punitive controls
promised in 1967. Instead of imposing new standards on manufacturers, the
agency instructed all licensees to operate sets meeting its requirements by
November, 1978 (43 FCC 2d 375 [1973]). The major new requirement was the
addition of modulation limiters to all units. The variety of legal uses for radio
equipment had prevented the Commission from legislating against the
manufacture of hobby frills like meters, squelch controls, and earphone jacks. But
by making compliance the responsibility of licensees instead of the responsibility
of manufacturers and retailers, the new rules encouraged operators to buy and
use gear that did not meet FCC requirements, especially cheaper foreign radios
that many hobby houses began to import for sale in great quantity. A user might
purchase a regulation transmitter and apply for a license, or might purchase a
cheaper transceiver complete with hobby frills and operate it without a license.
Mobile operation and the use of an anonymous "handle" made the chances of
being caught small.
Relaxation of the rules accompanied the development of a runaway CB market.

Total retail sales of more than $400 million in 1974 are said to have
exceeded $1 billion in 1975. Midwestern state troopers estimated in late 1975
that one out of every four cars and three out of every four long-haul trucks on
their highways were equipped with CB gear. Citizens' Band also had found a use in
farm operation. Manufacturers estimated that while only one in every 28
American families had a CB radio in 1975, one in each 15 farm families owned at
least one unit (22).
Rising demand created supply shortages. The American manufacturer, E. F.
Johnson, had a backlog of orders for more than $30 million by late 1974. Johnson,
which took the lead in individual CB sales from the importers after President
Nixon imposed a 10 percent surcharge in 1971, distributes its products through
six recreational vehicle makers, most of Union 76 Oil's 750 truck stops, the 3,500
auto dealerships of American Motors, Sears, Midas Muffler, and Western Auto
stores (25). In spite of Johnson's individual sales lead, Japanese manufacturers as
a group controlled an estimated 90 percent of the American CB market during
most of 1976. In 1975, Japanese firms exported more than four million units to
U.S. distributors. More than twelve million Japanese units valued at $634 million
were exported during the first nine months of 1976 (4). Tighter technical
standards on 40-channel sets have raised manufacturing costs too high for the
smaller of the 100-odd Japanese producers, however, and market control will
probably shift to American manufacturers. Eyeing this profit horizon are RCA,
General Electric and Panasonic, which have the power to upset the existing U.S.
market structure with lower prices and wider distribution. In 1975, 36 nervous
importers and distributors organized the Communications Equipment Distributors
Association in anticipation of this development (2).
The Commission had at last achieved a tacit agreement with the industry about
the use of the Citizens' service by a mass public.
In its 1974 proposal to double the CB spectrum, the FCC promised to
designate 30 channels expressly for inter-station calling (47 FCC 2d 1022 [1974]).
The prospects for the heavyweight electronics firms looked brighter than ever.
While other companies were forced to re-tool production and sell off old 23channel stocks, the giants could enter the market with spanking new 40-channel
rigs.
In August of 1975, the Commission began to implement its new proposals
(40 Fed. Reg. 33667 [1975]). Although hobby use was not explicitly permitted, the

prohibition against it was deleted. Handles might be used if accompanied by call
signs. The FCC announced that the new focus of its enforcement effort would be
directed against unlicensed and out-of-band operation, obscenity, and malicious
interference.
The CB boom is often attributed to the popularization of CB radio by
independent truckers during the 1973 oil crisis. For the FCC, however, 1973 was
simply another year of regulatory headache. In April, months before the oil crisis,
the agency's Field Engineering Bureau announced that unlicensed CB operation
was its biggest problem (5). Thirty engineers were sent across the country to track
down violators who were charged with offenses carrying prison terms and fines of
up to $10,000. One citizens’ group, the United CBer's of America, was charged
with distributing counterfeit FCC licenses, making false statements to the
Commission, and mail fraud.
By the time of the oil crisis, the world's “largest, chattiest party line" had an
estimated seven million users, and about four million licensed transmitters (1).
The new mass which overran the airways was not easily assimilated by local CB
communities which had been in existence for years. These experienced operators
monitored customary channels and traded bits of conversation with the "usuals"
on their channel as they drove to work, ironed clothes, or watched television.
Occasionally they ventured to a different channel to call an acquaintance in
another town or part of the city. Group members informally policed their own
channels to discourage obscenity and malicious interference. Other regulations
were ignored when they conflicted with informally developed and mutually
observed customs on local channels. Within the local frame of reference,
communication was orderly. The use of handles was more personal for most
operators and reflected their lifestyles. In the early 1970s, handles like Plumber,
Crowbar, Janitor, and Slim Jim characteristically referred to the occupations of
their owners and evidenced the blue-collar majority among users. Handles
evoking a middle-class leisure-oriented lifestyle, like Beachcomber, Sky Pilot, and
Tennis Bum, began to appear with the rush of novices to the band.
These new operators were nomadic travelers who had mastered the jargon
and etiquette for successful operation, but lacked a CB identity built on a
particular locality or group. The mass popularity of CB did not create a national
"community" of the road, as manufacturers have claimed, but disrupted localchannel groups for whom CB had been a focus of everyday shared experiences,
personal interests, and social occasions. By virtue of their growing numbers that

crowded all frequencies and generated continuous interference, the new band of
wandering operators using the radio mainly for thrills threatened to break up
older established communities of users.
Since many of these newcomers operate from automobiles,
the stereotyped image of CB users as truckers, the only stable
CB community on tire road, is understandable.
Outsiders are fascinated by the truckers' own adaptation of the older CB
argot and its alliteration, rhythm, economy of expression, and concrete,
imaginative terms. This distinctive language is a kind of secret code which pokes
fun at the establishment way of doing things and reflects the truck driver's more
uncompromising individuality in a society where regimented and impersonal
authority is a common experience. Defiance of authority splashed the Citizens'
Band into the headlines in the first place and made heroes of the truckers, who
have only marginal social acceptance in the majority culture. In spite of a vicarious
delight in this allegedly more virile and heroic world, however, the highway
pretender in his/her hermetically sealed automobile is safely insulated from
participation in the authentic world of the truck driver.
The truckers may well have the cultural resilience to resist the trivializing
assault on their special traditions by these outsiders and by the mass media
spotlight. For the stationary, established communities of users, however, the
future is more problematic. Once a medium for enhancing community life, CB is
fast acquiring an impersonal character more appropriate to the city, in which a
lack of concern for the rights and feelings of other operators is more and more
common.
The FCC originally desired a privatized Citizens' service for
communication within the individual household or small business.
This individualism was balanced by a notion of collective responsibility,
which acknowledged that only regulated self-restraint could make Citizens' radio,
a limited resource, freely available to all. Roughly 20 million operators have
shown that the pattern of communication between people is anything but
privatized. If the pattern of communication is comradely and not restricted to the
family or commercial unit, a new kind of individualism has appeared in the selfish
manner in which many operators conduct their conversations on the Citizens'

Band. That selfishness has been encouraged by the manufacturers who profit
from it.
Popular belief has it that the citizens have wrested from a stuffy
Commission the freedom to use their service as they please. Imaginative
operators have indeed gone far beyond the original proposals of the FCC in
inventing uses for the band. Lovers use CB for sweet talk; hitch-hikers call around
town for rides on it; politicians use it to chat with their constituencies; evangelists
distribute comfort and Bibles with it; mobile operators help police spot drunken
drivers and stolen cars. It remains to be seen whether uncontrolled congestion
will make the Citizens' Band unuseable, whether television and stereo owners will
have to pay more for equipment to filter out CB noise, whether ham operators,
who have been excellent stewards of their own frequencies, will have to give up
more and more space to the Citizens' Band. If manufacturers' and citizens' desires
seem to coincide for the moment, the history of the service shows that the
shifting coincidence of interest among citizens, industry, and government has
been full of surprises.
Note:
Carolyn Marvin and Quentin J. Schultze are Ph D. candidates at the Institute of
Communications Research, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
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